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ABSTRACT
A large body of research work and efforts have been focused on
detecting fake news and building online fact-check systems in
order to debunk fake news as soon as possible. Despite the exis-
tence of these systems, fake news is still wildly shared by online
users. It indicates that these systems may not be fully utilized. Af-
ter detecting fake news, what is the next step to stop people from
sharing it? How can we improve the utilization of these fact-check
systems? To fill this gap, in this paper, we (i) collect and analyze
online users called guardians, who correct misinformation and fake
news in online discussions by referring fact-checking URLs; and
(ii) propose a novel fact-checking URL recommendation model to
encourage the guardians to engage more in fact-checking activities.
We found that the guardians usually took less than one day to reply
to claims in online conversations and took another day to spread
verified information to hundreds of millions of followers. Our pro-
posed recommendation model outperformed four state-of-the-art
models by 11%∼33%. Our source code and dataset are available at
http://web.cs.wpi.edu/~kmlee/data/gau.html.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Fake news, misinformation, rumor or hoaxes are one of the most
concerning problems due to their popularity and negative effects
on society. Particularly, social networking sites (e.g., Twitter and
Facebook) have become a medium to disseminate fake news. There-
fore, companies and government agencies have paid attention to
solving fake news. For example, Facebook has a plan to combat
fake news1 and the FBI has investigated disinformation spread by
Russia and other countries2.
1http://fortune.com/2017/10/05/facebook-test-more-info-button-fake-news/
2http://bit.ly/FBIRussian
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Figure 1: An example of fact-checking activity.
To verify correctness of information, researchers proposed to
(i) employ experts, who can fact-check information [59], (ii) use
systems that can automatically check credibility of news [18, 32, 45];
and build models to detect fake news [7, 23, 34, 41, 53]. In 2016,
Reporter Lab reported that the number of fact-checking websites
went up by 50%3. However, fake news is still wildly disseminated
on social media even when it has been debunked [35, 50, 58].
A recent report [24] showed that 86% of American adults do
not fact-check articles they read. A possible explanation for this
is that people may trust content shared from their friends rather
than other sources [24] or they may not have time to fact-check
articles they read, or simply they may not know the existence of
these fact-check websites. It means that merely debunking fake
news is not enough, and these systems are not fully utilized.
Furthermore, it has been shown that once absorbing misinfor-
mation from fake news, individuals are less likely to change their
beliefs even when the fake news are debunked. If the idea in the
original fake news is especially similar to individuals’ viewpoints,
it will be even harder to change their minds [12, 39]. Therefore, it
is needed to deliver verified information quickly to online users
before fake news reaches them. To achieve this aim, the volume of
verified content should be large enough on social networks, so that
online users may have a higher chance to be exposed to legitimate
information before consuming fake news from other sources.
In this paper, we propose a framework to further utilize fact-
checked content. Particularly, we collect a group of people and
stimulate them to disseminate fact-checked content to other users.
However, achieving the goal is challenging because we have to
solve the two following problems: (P1) How can we find a group
of people (e.g. online users) who are willing to spread verified
news? (P2) How can we stimulate them to disseminate fact-checked
news/information?
3http://reporterslab.org/global-fact-checking-up-50-percent
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To deal with the first problem (P1), we may deploy bots [26, 48]
to disseminate information but it may violate terms of services of
online platforms due to abusing behavior. Another approach is to
hire crowd workers [28] and cyber troops to shape public opin-
ion [5]. However, this approach may cost a lot of money and is
difficult to deploy in larger scale due to monetary constraints. In-
spired by [17], we propose to rely on online users called guardians,
who show interests in correcting false claims and fake news in
online discussions by embedding fact-checking URLs. Figure 1 il-
lustrates who a guardian is and helps us to describe terminologies
that we use in this paper. In the figure, two Twitter users have a
conversation, in which a user @sir_mycroft accused the Clinton
foundation of accepting money from Uranium One company in
exchange for the approval of the deal between Uranium One and
Russian government in 2009. After just 15 minutes, this false ac-
cusation was debunked by a user @Politics_PR, who referred to
FactCheck.org and Snopes.com URLs as evidences to support his
factual correction. We call such direct replies, which contain fact-
checking URLs, direct fact-checking tweets (D-tweets). Users, who
posted D-tweets, are called direct guardians (D-guardians). The
user, to whom the D-guardian replied (i.e. @sir_mycroft), is called
an original poster. In addition, we observed that @Politics_PR’s re-
sponse was retweeted 15 times. We call these retweeters secondary
guardians (S-guardians), regardless of whether they added a com-
ment or not inside the retweet. Their shares are called secondary
tweets (S-tweets). Both D-guardians and S-guardians are called
guardians, and both D-tweets and S-tweets are called fact-checking
tweets. In Section 4, we investigate whether both D-guardians and S-
guardians play an important role in correcting claims and spreading
fact-checked information.
To cope with the second problem (P2), we may directly ask the
guardians to spread verified news like [27], but their response rate
may be low because each guardian may be interested in different
topics, and eventually, we may send unwanted requests to some of
the guardians. Thus, we tackle the second problem by proposing a
fact-checking URL recommendation model. By providing personal-
ized recommendations, we may stimulate guardians’ engagement
in fact-checking activities toward spreading credible information
to many other users and reducing the negative effects of fake news.
By addressing these two problems, we collect a large number of
reliable guardians and propose a fact-checking URL recommenda-
tion model which exploits recent success in embedding techniques
[31] and utilizes auxiliary data to personalize fact-checking URLs
for the guardians. Our main contributions are as follows:
• We are the first work to utilize guardians, who can help spread
credible information and recommend fact-checking URLs to the
guardians as a pro-active way to combat fake news.
• We thoroughly analyze who guardians are, their temporal be-
havior, and topical interests.
• Wepropose a novel URL recommendationmodel, which exploits
fact-checking URLs’ content (i.e., linked fact-checking pages),
social network structure, and recent tweets’ content.
• We evaluate our proposed model against four state-of-the-art
recommendation algorithms. Experimental results show that
our model outperforms the competing models by 11%∼33%.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we first summarize related work about fake news,
rumors and misinformation. Then, we cover the prior work on URL
recommendation on social network.
2.1 Fake News, Rumors and Misinformation
Although fake news on social media has been extensively studied, it
still attracts the attention of communities due to its negative impact
on society such as fake Russian Facebook ads and political events
[4]. The majority of studies focused on classifying rumors to either
true or false by exploiting different feature sets [7, 23, 34, 41, 53]
or by building deep learning models [33, 44]. In natural disasters
and emergency situations, misinformation was investigated as well
[15, 19, 58]. Several works attempted to detect rumors as soon
as possible using disputed signals [32, 58], leveraging network
embedding [54] and employing collective data sources [20, 40].
However, there is no work about combating fake news once it has
been debunked.
Another direction is to detect or classify stances of users (e.g.
supporting or denying) toward rumors [13, 41] and to analyze how
users’ stances have changed over time [30, 35, 59]. In addition to
studying rumors’ content, researchers [22, 30] also analyzed who
were involved in spreading those rumors. Since fake news can be
viewed as misinformation, work about detecting content polluters
[26], social bots [47] and malicious campaigns [48] are also related
to our work. The following two works [14, 17] are perhaps the
most closely related to our work. In particular, Hannak et al. [17]
analyzed the social relationship between the fact-checking user and
the fact-checked user in online conversations. [14] employed fact-
checking URLs in Snopes.com as a way to understand how rumors
were spread on Facebook. Our work differs from the prior works
[14, 17] since we focus on guardians, their temporal behavior and
topical interests, and propose a fact-checking URL recommendation
model to personalize relevant fact-checking URLs.
2.2 URL Recommendation on Social Media
Chen et al., [8] proposed a content-based method to recommend
URLs on Twitter. [1] proposed hashtag-based, topic-based and
entity-based methods to build user profiles for news personaliza-
tion. By enriching user profiles with external data sources [2, 3],
Abel et al., improved URL recommendation results. Taking a similar
content-based approach, Yamaguchi et al., [56] employed Twitter
lists to recommend fresh URLs and [16] tried to recommend URLs
on streaming data. [10] proposed an SVM based approach to rec-
ommend URLs. Dong et al., [11] exploited Twitter data to discover
fresh websites for a web search engine. However, to the best of our
knowledge there is no prior work employing matrix factorization
models and auxiliary information to recommend URLs to guardians
on Twitter. In addition to recommending URLs, researchers also
focused on personalizing who to follow [6], interesting tweets [9],
and Twitter lists [42].
3 DATA COLLECTION
In this section, we describe our data collection strategy. Unlike
the prior work [17] which collected only a small number of D-
tweets (∼4000), we employed the Hoaxy system [45] to collect
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|D-tweets| |S-tweets| |D-guardians| |S-guardians| |D&S guardians|
157,482 67,586 70,900 45,406 7,167
Table 1: Statistics of our dataset.
Top15 D-guardians and # of D-tweets
RandoRodeo (450) stuartbirdman (318) upayr (214)
pjr_cunningham (430) ilpiese (297) JohnOrJane (213)
TXDemocrat (384) BreastsR4babies (255) GreenPeaches2 (199)
Jkj193741 (355) rankled2 (230) spencerthayer (195)
BookRageStuff (325) ___lor__ (221) SaintHeartwing (174)
Top 15 S-guaridans and # of S-tweets
Jkj193741 (294) MrDane1982 (49) LeChatNoire4 (35)
MudNHoney (229) pinch0salt (46) bjcrochet (34)
_sirtainly (75) ActualFlatticus (42) upayr (33)
Paul197 (66) BeltwayPanda (36) 58isthenew40 (33)
Endoracrat (49) EJLandwehr (36) slasher48 (31)
Table 2: Top 15 most active D-guardians and S-guardians,
and associated # of D-tweets and # of S-tweets.
Verified guardians and (|D-tweets| vs. |S-tweets|)
fawfulfan (103-1) tomcoates (37-0) KimLaCapria (27-3)
OpenSecretsDC (37-30) aravosis (29-8) PattyArquette (29-0)
PolitiFact (41-17) TalibKweli (27-8) NickFalacci (28-0)
RobertMaguire_ (46-7) rolandscahill (31-0) AaronJFentress (28-0)
jackschofield (42-1) MichaelKors (30-0) ParkerMolloy (26-1)
Table 3: Top 15 verified guardians, and corresponding D-
tweet and S-tweet count.
a large number of both D-tweets and S-tweets. In particular, we
collected 231,377 unique fact-checking tweets from six well-known
fact-checking websites - Snopes.com, Politifact.com, FactCheck.org,
OpenSecrets.org, TruthOrfiction.com and Hoax-slayer.net – via the
APIs provided by the Hoaxy system which internally used Twitter
streaming API. The collected data consisted of 161,981 D-tweets
and 69,396 S-tweets (58,821 retweets of D-tweets and 10,575 quotes
of D-tweets) generated from May 16, 2016 to July 7, 2017 (∼ 1 year
and 2 month). The number of our collected D-tweets is 40 times
larger than the dataset used in the prior work [17].
Similar to the prior work, we removed tweets containing only
base URLs (e.g., snopes.com or politifact.com) or URLs simply point-
ing to the background information of the websites because the
tweets containing these URLs may not reflect fact-checking enthu-
siasm and not contain fact-checking information. After filtering,
we had 225,068 fact-checking tweets consisting of 157,482 D-tweets
and 67,586 S-tweets posted by 70,900 D-guardians and 45,406 S-
guardians. 7,167 users played both roles of D-guardians and S-
guardians. The number of unique fact-checking URLs was 7,295. In
addition, we also collected each guardian’s recent 200 tweets. Table
1 shows the statistics of our pre-processed dataset.
4 CHARACTERISTICS OF GUARDIANS
From our dataset, we seek to answer the following research ques-
tions about guardians, their temporal behavior and topical interests.
Who are the guardians?
As we have shown in the previous section, there were only 7,167
users (7%) who behaved as both D-guardians and S-guardians,
which indicates that guardians usually focused on either fact-checking
claims in conversations (i.e., being D-guardians) or simply sharing
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Figure 2: Ranges of response time of D-guardians and S-
guardians, and inter-posting time of S-tweets. The color in
(c) indicates the number of pairs.
credible information (i.e., being S-guardians). Since D-guardians
and S-guardians played different roles, we seek to understand which
group is more enthusiastic about its role. We created two lists - a
list of the number of D-tweets posted by each D-guardian and a list
of the number of S-tweets posted by each S-guardian –, excluding
D&S guardians who performed both roles. Then, by conducting
One-sided MannWhitney U-test, we found that D-guardians were
significantly more enthusiastic about their role than S-guardians
(p-value<10−6). We also found that even the D&S guardians posted
relatively larger number of D-tweets than S-tweets according to
Wilcoxon one-sided test (p-value<10−6).
The majority of guardians (85.3%) posted only 1∼2 fact-checking
tweets. However, there were super active guardians, each of whom
posted over 200 fact-checking tweets. Table 2 shows the top 15
most active D-guardians and S-guardians and the number of their
D-tweets and S-tweets. As we can see, the most active D-guardians
showed their strong enthusiasm for posting fact-checked content
in online discussions. Red-colored Jkj193741 and upayr guardians
were especially active in joining online conversations and spreading
fact-checked information.
Next, we examined whether guardians have verified Twitter ac-
counts or are highly visible users, who have at least 5,000 followers.
The verified accounts and highly visible users usually play an im-
portant role in social media since their fact-checking tweets can
reach many audiences [27, 46]. Since the verified accounts are more
trustworthy, their fact-checking tweets are often shared by many
other users. In our dataset, 2,401 guardians (2.2%) had verified ac-
counts. Table 3 shows the top 15 verified accounts. Interestingly,
some of these verified accounts behaved as D&S guardians, high-
lighted with the blue color in the table. Particularly, @PolitiFact,
and @OpenSecretsDC, the official accounts of Politifact.com and
OpenSecrets.org, frequently engaged in many online conversations.
8,221 guardians (7.5%) were highly visible users. Most top verified
guardians, and many top S-guardians had a large number of fol-
lowers. Altogether, S-tweets of the 45,406 S-guardians reached over
200 million followers.
Based on the analysis, we conclude that both D-guardians and
S-guardians played important roles in terms of fact-checking claims
and spreading the fact-checked news to the other users. Therefore,
we need both types of guardians to spread credible information.
How quickly did guardians respond?
To further understand activeness of guardians, we examined how
quickly D-guardians posted their fact-checking URLs as responses
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Figure 4: Topical changes of fact-checking tweets
to original posters’ claims in online conversations. In particular, we
measured response time of a D-tweet/D-guardian as a gap between
an original poster’s posting time and the fact-checking D-tweet’s
time. We collected all response time of D-tweets, grouped them
and plotted a bar chart in Figure 2(a). The mean and median of
response time were 2.26 days and 34 minutes, respectively. 90%
of D-tweets were posted within one day, indicating D-guardians
quickly responded to the claims and expressed their enthusiasm by
posting fact-checking URLs/tweets.
Similarly, we alsomeasured response time of an S-tweet/S-guardian
(Figure 2(b)) as a gap between D-tweet’s posting time and the cor-
responding S-tweet’s posting time. The mean and median of the
response time were 3.1 days and 90 minutes, respectively. 88.5% of
S-tweets were posted within one day, indicating S-guardians also
quickly responded and spread fact-checked information.
Finally, we measured S-guardians’ inter-posting time to under-
stand how long it took between two consecutive S-tweets, given the
corresponding D-tweet. First, we grouped S-tweets based on each
corresponding D-tweet, and sorted them in the ascending order
of S-tweet creation time. Next, within each group, we computed
inter-posting time δi as a gap between two consecutive S-tweets i
and i + 1 and created pairs of inter-posting time (δi ,δi+1). These
pairs were merged across all the groups and were plotted in log2
scale in Figure 2(c). Overall, the average inter-posting time was 5
minutes, which means an S-tweet was posted once per 5 minutes
by S-guardians after the corresponding D-tweet was posted. To
sum up, both D-guardians and S-guardians were active and quickly
responded to claims and fact-checked content.
How did the volume of fact-checking tweets change over
time? How did topics associated with fact-checking pages
change over time?
First, we examined the change in the number of fact-checking
tweets (i.e., D-tweets and S-tweets) in each month between May
2016 and July 2017. Figure 3 shows temporal changes of the num-
ber of fact-checking tweets. In the first 5 months, the number of
fact-checking tweets increased gradually. In November 2016, the
number of fact-checking tweets reached the peak (25,000 tweets)
because of the US presidential election which happened on No-
vember 8, 2016. We also noticed that the number of D-tweets were
larger than the number of S-tweets in every month which reflects
that D-guardians were more active than S-guardians in online con-
versations (Wilcoxon one-side test p-value=3.052× 10−5). However,
both D-guardians and S-guardians consistently posted and spread
fact-checking tweets, respectively.
Next, we were interested in understanding what topics the fact-
checking pages (linked by the URLs) were associated with and
whether these topics changed over time. We first checked if a fact-
checking website has categories, and if it did, we checked if we
could automatically get the category information associated with
each fact-checking page. For Snope pages, we identified each fact-
checking page’s topic by extracting the breadcrumb or tag infor-
mation on the fact-checking page. We annotated PolitiFact pages’
topic as politics due to its political missions. In this analysis, we
did not include fact-checking pages associated with the other four
fact-checking websites because there were no explicit categories
in content of the fact-checking pages, and their coverage was only
17.22% (which would not contribute much to topical changes). Fig-
ure 4 shows temporal topical changes of fact-checking tweets in
each month. Overall, politics was the most popular in all months.
Interestingly, fact-checking tweets under fauxtography, fake news
and fact check increased significantly in November 2016 (the month
of US presidential election). In short, guardians’ fact-checking ac-
tivities were consistent over time, and their topical interests were
mainly politics, fauxtography and fake news.
What fact-checkingURLswere spreadmost by the guardians?
What fact-checking websites did guardians embed in fact-
checking tweets?What were themost important terms used
in the fact-checking pages and 200 recent tweets?
Figure 5(a) shows the six most popular URLs embedded in fact-
checking tweets. The URLs were related to Hillary Clinton and
Donald Trump. Figure 5(b) shows what websites guardians used as
references. Snopes.com was the most popular website, and politi-
fact.com was the next frequently used one (48.55% vs. 34.23%).
To answer the last question, given a fact-checking page linked
by each of D-tweets and S-tweets, we extracted the main content
after removing headers, footers and irrelevant content. Then, we
selected the top 250 words according to tf-idf values. Similarly,
given 200 recent tweets of each guardian, we first aggregated them
to make a big document, removed non-English tweets, stop words,
and URLs. Then, we selected the top 250 words according to tf-idf
values. As shown in Figure 5(c) and 5(d), “trump” was mentioned
often in both word clouds. Surprisingly, “hillary” and “clinton” were
less frequently mentioned than Trump-related words. The figures
also confirm that politics were one of popular topics, especially
Trump-related news was one of popular claims.
5 FACT-CHECKING URL RECOMMENDATION
In the previous section, we found that the guardians are enthusias-
tic about credibility of information on social network and highly
The Rise of Guardians: Fact-checking URL Recommendation to Combat Fake News SIGIR ’18, July 8–12, 2018, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Fact-checking URLs0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
#f
ac
t-c
he
ck
ing
 tw
ee
ts
http://bit.ly/undocIMG
http://bit.ly/Trump_Claims
http://bit.ly/BirthMove
http://bit.ly/childRape
http://bit.ly/ClintonDeal
http://bit.ly/TrumpFile
(a) Fact-checking URLs
48.55%
snopes.com
34.23%
politifact.com
8.95%
factcheck.org
6.63%
opensecrets.org
1.64%
others
(b) Fact-checking websites
news
fact us
check
tru
m
p
newpromise
politifact
promises
national
m
os
tly
nasa
subject
florida
darkness
updated
saidstatedonald
editions
false
fire
health
people
half
texas
tru
e
president
california
pa
nt
s
percent
tv
wisconsin
punditfact
rumor
november
email
business
random
media
clinton
video
virginia
carolina
global lo
bb
yin
g
advertise
politics
days
on
e
snopes
ohio
contributions
campaigngeorgia
br
ok
en
ob
am
a
top
pennsylvania
radio
tax
million
illi
no
is
march
co
lor
ad
o
compromise arizona
ne
va
da
data
ho
us
e
flip
ha
m
ps
hir
e
iowa
york
care
elections
center
missouri
legends
rh
od
e
process
view
ke
pt
m
on
ey
pac
federal
bill
rulings
facebook
staff
re
pu
bli
ca
n
address
no
rth
law crime
soros
tim
e
po
lic
y
united
character
episode
american
opensecrets
draft
act
scams
scam
nazi
holidays
science
sa
ys
fake
confirms
ex
pe
rie
nc
ing
states
w
ed
din
gs
election
nu
ge
nt
cokelore
embarrassments
rumors
committee
po
liti
cia
ns
int
er
vie
w
coupon
influence
political
senate
groups
police
named
year
report d
ist
ric
t
tw
o
ho
t
informationpacs
candidate
security
matters
analysis
gr
ou
p
story
straight
rebellion
pr
es
ide
nt
ial
inboxer
island
years
resources
father
public
told
sanders
m
ak
e
department
country
statement
numbers
hillary
congressional
want
pence
made
congress
government
article
university
post
posts
rates
newsletter
first
actually
mike
ba
ckcopyright
market
overview
office
john
organizations
companies
ins
ur
an
ce
immigration
terms
issues
action
number
cla
im
times
military
rated
barack
fo
od
found
vote
history
join
(c) Top words in fact-checking pages
trump
people
o
n
ewhite
president
us
know
right
time
think
good
new
wantsay
never
need
ca
go
news
make
obama
going
still
even said
to
da
y
america
vi
a let
m
a
n
re
a
lly
says
gop take
arpaio
m
a
ny
day
house
please
every
back
charlottesville
donald
also
much
russia
racist
w
ay
well
st
op
first
nazis
country
years
great
help
hate
re
a
d
must
lo
ve
vo
te
thing
look american
yes
last
m
e
di
a
ever
hillary
war
pardon
su
pp
or
t
re
a
l
call
care
o
h
keep
made
someone
n
a
zi
sure
bad
nothing
blacktw
e
e
t
work
americans
another
world
tell
w
o
m
e
n
be
tte
r
fake
thank
party
actually
anyone be
lie
ve
le
ft
guy
russian
law
cl
in
to
n
history
st
at
e
tw
itt
er
show
everyone
so
m
e
th
in
g
remember
bill
money
police
give
republicans
try
in
g
since
always
saying
rally
watch
year
wrong
two
bannon
joe
wo
th
an
ks
th
in
gs
sp
ee
ch
texas
st
or
y
best
come
big
job
harvey
u
se
point
called
true
br
ea
kin
g
life
health
vi
de
o
maybe
yet
person
congress
lol
put
free
m
e
a
n
shit
god
done
election
next
n
e
e
ds
su
pr
em
ac
ist
s
anything
lo
ng
getting
pay
family
away
ca
m
pa
ig
n
e
n
o
u
gh
racism
ho
us
to
n
putinth
ou
gh
t
ho
pe
hey
days
hu
rri
ca
ne
o
ld
agree
live
states
already
yeah
public
m
a
ke
s
without
little
fa
ct
find
potus
wants
power
woman
re
tw
e
e
t
de
m
oc
ra
ts
military
talking
violence
week
cnn
republican
fuck
thread
change
part
used
office
tax
lot
million
tim
es
name
wall
government
vo
te
d
stand
words
fox
hard
political
e
n
d
fuckingago
making
trumprussia
try
be
rn
ie
m
e
n
fa
rt
he
re
si
st
an
ce
feel
attack
lost
told
everything
a
n
tif
a
looks
around
tonight
w
h
dems
national
rights
mueller
wow
service
fight
talk
truth
might
pr
ob
le
m
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Figure 5: (a) The most spread fact-checking URLs, (b) the most popular fact-checking websites, (c) the most important words
in fact-checking pages linked by D-tweets and S-tweets and (d) the most important words in 200 recent tweets
active in spreading fact-checked content. To encourage them to
further engage in disseminating verified information, we propose
a recommendation model to personalize fact-checking URLs. The
aim of the recommendation model is to help guardians quickly
access new interesting fact-checking URLs/pages so that they could
embed them in their messages, correct unverified claims or mis-
information, and spread fact-checked information. We use terms
“fact-checking URLs” and “URLs”, interchangeably.
5.1 Problem Statement
Let N = {u1,u2, ...,uN } and M = {ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓM } be a set of N
guardians and a set ofM fact-checking URLs, respectively. We view
the action of embedding a fact-checking URL ℓj into a fact-checking
tweet of guardianui as an interaction pair (ui , ℓj ). We form a matrix
X ∈ RN×M whereXi j = 1 if the guardianui posted a fact-checking
URL ℓj . Otherwise, Xi j = 0. Our main goal is to learn a model
that recommends similar URLs to guardians whose interests are
similar. In particular, we aim to learn matrix U ∈ RN×D , where
each row vectorUTi ∈ RD×1 is the latent representation of guardian
ui , and matrix V ∈ RD×M , where each column vector Vj ∈ RD×1
is the latent representation of URL ℓj . D ≪ min(M,N ) is latent
dimensions. Toward the goal, we propose our initial/basic matrix
factorization model as follows:
min
U,V
∥Ω ⊙ (X − UV)∥2F + λ(∥U∥2F + ∥V∥2F ) (1)
where Ω ∈ RN×M , and Ωi j = 1 if Xi j = 1. Otherwise, Ωi j = 0.
Operators ⊙ and ∥.∥2F are Hadamard product and Frobenius norm,
respectively. Finally, λ is regularization factor to avoid overfitting.
5.2 Co-ocurrence model
Now, we turn to extend our basic model in Eq.1 by further utiliz-
ing the interaction matrix X. Inspired by [31, 38], we propose to
regularize our basic model in Eq.1 by generating two additional
matrices - URL-URL co-occurrence matrix and guardian-guardian
co-occurrence matrix. Our main intuition of the extension is that
a pair of URLs, which were posted by the same guardian, may be
similar to each other. Likewise, a pair of guardians who posted the
same URLs may be alike. To better understand our proposed models,
we present the word embedding model as background information.
5.2.1 Word embedding model. Given a sequence of training
words, word embedding models attempt to learn the distributed
vector representation of each word. A typical example is word2vec
proposed by Mikolov et al. [38]. Given a training wordw , the main
objective of the skip-grammodel inword2vec is to predict the context
words (i.e. the words that appear in a fixed-size context window)
of w . Recently, it has been shown that training skip-gram model
with negative sampling is similar to factorizing a word-context
matrix named Shifted Positive PointwiseMutual Informationmatrix
(SPPMI ) [29]. Given a word i and its context word j, the value
SPPMI (i, j) is computed as follows:
SPPMI (i, j) =max{PMI (i, j) − loд(s), 0} (2)
where s ≥ 1 is the number of negative samples, and PMI (i, j) is an
element of Pointwise Mutual Information (PMI) matrix. PMI (i, j) is
estimated as log
(
#(i, j)×|D |
#(i)×#(j)
)
where #(i, j) is the number of times that
word j appears in the context window of word i . #(i) = ∑j #(i, j),
and #(j) = ∑i #(i, j). |D | is the total number of pairs of word and
context word. Note that PMI (i, i) = 0 for every word i .
5.2.2 URL-URL co-occurrence. Wegenerate amatrixR ∈ RM×M
where Ri j = SPPMI (ℓi , ℓj ) based on co-occurrence of URLs. In par-
ticular, for each URL ℓi posted by a specific guardian, we define its
context as all other URLs ℓj posted by the same guardian. Based on
this definition, #(i, j) means the number of guardians that posted
both URL ℓi and ℓj . #(i, j) is also interpreted as the co-occurrence
of URL ℓi and URL ℓj . After that, we compute PMI (ℓi , ℓj ) and
SPPMI (ℓi , ℓj ) based on Equation 2 for all pairs of ℓi and ℓj .
5.2.3 Guardian-Guardian co-occurrence. Similarly, the context
for each guardian ui is defined as all other guardians uj who posted
the same URL with ui . Then, #(i, j) is the number of URLs that
both guardian ui and guardian uj commonly posted. Given this
definition, we can generate a SPPMI matrix G ∈ RN×N where
Gi j = SPPMI (ui ,uj ). The same value of hyper-parameter s is used
for generating matrices R and G.
5.2.4 Regularizing matrix factorization with co-occurrence ma-
trices. Our intuition is that URLs which are commonly posted by
similar set of guardians are similar, and guardians who commonly
posted the same set of URLs are close to each other. With that intu-
ition, we propose loss function LXRG – a joint matrix factorization
model of three matrices X, R and G as follows:
LXRG = ∥Ω ⊙ (X − UV)∥2F + λ(∥U∥2F + ∥V∥2F )
+ ∥Rmask ⊙ (R − VTK)∥2F + ∥Gmask ⊙ (G − UL)∥2F
(3)
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whereRmask ∈ RM×M ,Rmaski j = 1 ifRi j > 0. Otherwise,Rmaski j =
0. Gmask ∈ RN×N , Gmaski j = 1 if Gi j > 0. Otherwise, Gmaski j = 0.
Two matrices K ∈ RD×M and L ∈ RD×N act as additional parame-
ters. Although our work shares similar ideas with [31], there are
three key differences between our model and [31] as follows: (1)
we omit bias matrices to reduce model complexity which is helpful
in reducing overfitting, (2) additional matrix G is factorized and (3)
we do not regularize parameters K and L.
5.3 Integrating Auxiliary Information
In addition, we propose auxiliary information which will be inte-
grated with Eq.3 to improve URL recommendation performance.
5.3.1 Modeling social structure. The social structure of guardians
may reflect the homophily phenomenon indicating that guardians
who follow each other may have similar interests in fact-checking
URLs [49]. To model this social structure of guardians, we first
construct an unweighted undirected graph G(V ,E) where nodes
are guardians, and an edge (ui ,uj ) between guardians ui and uj
are formed if ui follows uj or uj follows ui . In our dataset, in total,
there were 1,033,704 edges in G(V ,E) (density=0.013898), which
is 5.9 times higher than reported density in [57], indicating dense
connections between guardians. We represent G(V ,E) by using an
adjacency matrix S ∈ RN×N where Si j = 1 if there is an edge
(ui ,uj ). Otherwise, Si j = 0. Second, we use Equation 4 as a regular-
ization term to make latent representations of connected guardians
similar to each other. Then, we formally minimize L1 as follows:
L1 = ∥S − UUT ∥2F (4)
5.3.2 Modeling topical interests based on 200 recent tweets. In
addition to social structure, the content of 200 recent tweets may
reflect guardians’ interests [1, 2, 8]. In Figure 5(d), 200 recent tweets
of guardians contain many political words, which suggests us to
enrich guardians’ latent representation based on tweets’ content.
For each guardian, we build a document by aggregating his/her
200 recent tweets and then employ the Doc2Vec model [25] to learn
latent representations of the document. Doc2Vec is an unsuper-
vised learning algorithm, which automatically learns high quality
representation of documents. We use Gensim4 as implementation
of the Doc2Vec, set 300 as latent dimensions of documents, and
train Doc2Vec model for 100 iterations. After training Doc2Vec
model, we derive cosine similarity of every pair of learned vectors
to create a symmetric matrixXuu ∈ RN×N , whereXuu (i, j) ∈ [0; 1]
represents the similarity of document vectors of guardians ui and
uj . Intuitively, if two guardians have similar interests, their docu-
ment vectors may be similar. Thus, we regularize guardians’ latent
representations to make them as close as possible by minimizing
the following objective function:
L2 = 12
N∑
i=1, j=1
Xuu (i, j)∥UTi −UTj ∥2
=
N∑
i=1
UTi Duu (i, i)Ui −
N∑
i=1, j=1
UTi Xuu (i, j)Uj
= Tr (UTDuuU) −Tr (UTXuuU) = Tr (UTLuuU)
(5)
4https://radimrehurek.com/gensim/
where Duu ∈ RN×N is a diagonal matrix with diagonal element
Duu (i, i) = ∑Nj=1 Xuu (i, j). Tr (.) is the trace of matrix, and Luu =
Duu − Xuu , which is a Laplacian matrix of the matrix Xuu .
5.3.3 Modeling topical similarity of fact-checking pages. We fur-
ther exploit the content of fact-checking URLs (i.e., fact-checking
pages) as an additional data source to improve recommendation
quality. As we can see in Figure 5(c), URLs’ contents are mostly
about politics. Intuitively, if the content of two URLs are similar
(e.g. they are about Hillary Clinton’s foundation as shown in Figure
1), their latent representations should be close. Exploiting the con-
tent of a fact-checking URL has been employed in [2, 51]. In this
paper, we apply a different approach, in which the Doc2Vec model
is utilized to learn latent representation of URLs. Hyperparameters
of the Doc2Vec model are the same as what we used for content of
tweets. After training the Doc2Vec model, we derive the symmetric
similarity matrix Xℓℓ ∈ RM×M and minimize the loss function L3
in Equation 6 as a way to regulate latent representation of URLs.
L3 = 12
M∑
i=1, j=1
Xℓℓ(i, j)∥Vi −Vj ∥2
=
M∑
i=1
ViDℓℓ(i, i)VTi −
M∑
i=1, j=1
ViXℓℓ(i, j)VTj
= Tr (V(Dℓℓ − Xℓℓ)VT )
= Tr (VLℓℓVT )
(6)
where Dℓℓ ∈ RM×M is a diagonal matrix with elements on the
diagonal Dℓℓ(i, i) =
∑M
j=1 Xℓℓ(i, j) and Lℓℓ = Dℓℓ −Xℓℓ , which is
the graph Laplacian of the matrix Xℓℓ .
5.4 Joint-learning fact-checking URL
recommendation model
Finally, we propose GAU - a joint model of Guardian-Guardian
SPPMI matrix, Auxiliary information and URL-URL SPPMI matrix.
The objective function of our model, LGAU , is presented in Eq.7:
min
U,V,L,K
LGAU = ∥Ω ⊙ (X − UV)∥2F + λ(∥U∥2F + ∥V∥2F )
+ ∥Rmask ⊙ (R − VTK)∥2F
+ ∥Gmask ⊙ (G − UL)∥2F
+ α × ∥S − UUT ∥2F
+ γ ×Tr (UTLuuU)
+ β ×Tr (VLℓℓVT )
(7)
where α ,γ , β, λ and shifted negative sampling value s are hyper
parameters, tuned based on a validation set. We optimize LGAU by
using gradient descent to iteratively update parameters with fixed
learning rate η = 0.001. The details of the optimization algorithm
are presented in Algorithm 1. After learning U and V, we estimate
the guardian ui ’s preference for URL ℓj as: rˆi, j ≈ UiVj . The final
URLs recommended for a guardian ui is formed based on ranking:
ui : ℓj1 > ℓj2 > ... > ℓjM → rˆi, j1 > rˆi, j2 > ... > rˆi, jM (8)
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The derivatives of loss LGAU with respect to parameters U, V, K
and L are as follows:
∂LGAU
∂U
= −2(Ω ⊙ Ω ⊙ (X − UV))VT + 2λ × (U)
−2(Gmask ⊙ Gmask ⊙ (G − UL))LT
−2α((S − UUT + (S − UUT )T )U)
+γ × (Luu + LTuu )U
∂LGAU
∂V
= −2UT (Ω ⊙ Ω ⊙ (X − UV)) + 2λ × (V)
−2K(Rmask ⊙ Rmask ⊙ (R − VTK))T
+β × V(Lℓℓ + LTℓℓ)
∂LGAU
∂L
= −2UT (Gmask ⊙ Gmask ⊙ (G − UL))
∂LGAU
∂K
= −2V(Rmask ⊙ Rmask ⊙ (R − VTK))
(9)
Algorithm 1 GAU Optimization algorithm
Input: Guardian-URL interaction matrix X, URL-URL SPPMI matrix R,
Guardian-Guardian SPPMI matrix G, social structure matrix S, Lapla-
cian matrix Luu of guardians, Laplician matrix Lℓℓ of URLs, binary
matrices Ω, Rmask and Gmask as indication matrices.
Output: U and V
1: Initialize U, V, K and L with Gaussian distribution N(0, 0.012), t ← 0
2: while Not Converged do
3: Compute ∂LGAU∂U ,
∂LGAU
∂V ,
∂LGAU
∂L and
∂LGAU
∂K in Eq.9
4: Ut+1 ← Ut − η ∂LGAU∂U
5: Vt+1 ← Vt − η ∂LGAU∂V
6: Lt+1 ← Lt − η ∂LGAU∂L
7: Kt+1 ← Kt − η ∂LGAU∂K
8: t ← t + 1
return U and V
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we thoroughly experiment our proposedGAU model.
In particular, we aim to answer the following research questions:
• RQ1:What is the benefit of integrating auxiliary data such as
tweets, fact-checking URL’s content and network structure?
• RQ2: How helpful is adding SPPMI matrices of fact-checking
URLs and guardians?
• RQ3: What is the performance of the proposed GAU model
compared with other state-of-the-arts methods?
• RQ4:What is the performance of the proposed GAU model for
different types of guardians in terms of activeness level?
• RQ5:What is the sensitivity of GAU to hyperparameters?
6.1 Experimental Settings
Processing our dataset. We were interested in selecting active
and professional guardians who frequently posted fact-checking
URLs since they would be more likely to spread recommended
fact-checking URLs than casual guardians.
Following a similar preprocessing approach to recommending
scientific articles [51, 52], we only selected guardians who used at
least three distinct fact-checking URLs in their D-tweets and/or
S-tweets. Altogether, 12,197 guardians were selected for training
and evaluating recommendation models. They posted 4,834 distinct
fact-checking URLs in total. The number of interactions was 68,684
(Sparsity:99.9%). There were 9,710 D-guardians, 6,674 S-guardians
and 4,187 users who played both roles. The total number of follow-
ers of the 12,197 guardians was 55,325,364, indicating their high
impact on fact-checked information propagation.
Experimental design andmetrics. To validate our model, we fol-
lowed a similar approach that [31] did. In particular, we randomly
selected 70%, 10% and 20% URLs of each guardian for training,
validation and testing. The validation data was used to tune hyper-
parameters and to avoid overfitting. We repeated this evaluation
scheme for five times, getting five different sets of training, vali-
dation and test data. The average results were reported. We used
three standard ranking metrics such as Recall@k, MAP@k (Mean
Average Precision) and NDCG@k (Normalized Discounted Cumu-
lative Gain) [31, 36]. Since k = 10 was used in [1], we tested our
model with k ∈ {5, 10, 15}.
6.2 Baselines and Our Model
We compared our proposed model with the following four state-of-
the-art collaborative filtering algorithms:
• BPRMF Bayesian Personalized Ranking Matrix Factorization
[43] optimizes the matrix factorization model with pairwise
ranking loss. It is a common baseline for item recommendation.
• MFMatrix Factorization (MF) [21] is a standard technique in
collaborative filtering. Given an interaction matrix X ∈ RN×M ,
it factorizes X into two matrices U ∈ RN×D and V ∈ RD×M ,
which are latent representations of users and items, respectively.
• CoFactor CoFactor [31] extended Weighted Matrix Factoriza-
tion (WMF) by jointly decomposing interaction matrix X and
co-occurrence SPPMI matrix for items (i.e., fact-checking URLs
in this context). We set a confidence value cXi j=1 = 1.0 for
Xi j = 1, and we set cXi j=0 = 0.01 for non-observed interaction.
The number of negative samples s was grid-searched in a set
s ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 50}, following the same settings as in [31].
• CTR Collaborative Filtering Regression [51] employed content
of URLs (i.e., fact-checking pages in this context) to recommend
scientific papers to users. Following exactly the best setting
reported in the paper, we selected the top 8,000 words from
fact-checking URLs’ contents based on the mean of tf-idf values
and set λu = 0.01, λv = 100, D=200, a=1 and b=0.01.
To build our GAU model, we conducted the grid-search to select
the best value of α , β and γ in {0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08}. The num-
ber of negative samples s for constructing SPPMI matrices was in
{1, 2, 5, 10, 50}. For all of the baselines and the GAU model, we set
latent dimensions toD = 100 unless explicitly stated, and regulariza-
tion value λ was grid-searched in {10−5, 3×10−5, 5×10−5, 7×10−5}
by default. We only report the best result of each baseline.
We also attempted to compare our proposed model with content-
based recommendation algorithms [1–3, 56]. These methods mostly
required collecting additional data from external data sources which
are very time-consuming and expensive, and sometimes impossible
for the third party researchers. We tried to compare our model with
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Methods Recall@5 NDCG@5 MAP@5 Recall@10 NDCG@10 MAP@10 Recall@15 NDCG@15 MAP@15 Avg. Rank
BASIC 0.08919 (6) 0.06004 (6) 0.04839 (6) 0.13221 (6) 0.07417 (6) 0.05413 (6) 0.16208 (6) 0.08227 (6) 0.05653 (6) 6.0
BASIC+NW+UC 0.09967 (4) 0.06814 (5) 0.05535 (5) 0.14817 (4) 0.08399 (4) 0.06170 (5) 0.18280 (3) 0.09335 (5) 0.06432 (5) 4.4
BASIC+NW+UC+CSU 0.09900 (5) 0.06822 (4) 0.05604 (4) 0.14688 (5) 0.08386 (5) 0.06235 (4) 0.18266 (4) 0.09354 (4) 0.06522 (4) 4.3
BASIC+CSU+CSG 0.10247 (3) 0.06958 (3) 0.05670 (3) 0.14950 (3) 0.08497 (3) 0.06293 (3) 0.18205 (5) 0.09380 (3) 0.06554 (3) 3.2
BASIC+NW+UC+CSU+CSG 0.11133 (2) 0.07422 (2) 0.05978 (2) 0.16127 (2) 0.09065 (2) 0.06646 (2) 0.19516 (2) 0.09980 (2) 0.06917 (2) 2.0
Our GAU model 0.11582 (1) 0.07913 (1) 0.06481 (1) 0.16400 (1) 0.09489 (1) 0.07118 (1) 0.19693 (1) 0.10381 (1) 0.07382 (1) 1.0
Table 4: Effectiveness of using auxiliary information and co-occurrence matrices. The GAU model outperforms the other
variants significantly with p-value<0.001.
recent work [56] and collected 5,383,598 followees of the 12,196
guardians and over 15 million distinct Twitter lists in which at least
one of the followees was included. However, we were not able to
collect all fact-checking tweets posted by these followees during
the same data collection period (from May 16, 2016 to July 7, 2017).
Therefore, we only used followees that were in the set of 12,197
guardians. But, maybe because of the limited data, it performed
poorly in the experiments. Therefore, we omit its results in the
experiments. Instead, we report performance of our GAU model
and the four state-of-the-art collaborative filtering algorithms.
6.3 Effectiveness of Auxiliary Information and
SPPMI Matrices (RQ1 & RQ2)
Before comparing our GAU model with the four baselines, we first
examined the effectiveness of exploiting auxiliary information and
the utility of jointly factorizing SPPMI matrices. Starting from our
basic model in Eq.1, we created variants of the GAU model. Since
there are many variants ofGAU , we selectively report performance
of the following GAU ’s variants:
• Our basic model (Equation 1) (BASIC)
• BASIC + Network + URL’s content (BASIC+NW+UC)
• BASIC + Network + URL’s content + URL’s SPPMI matrix (BA-
SIC+NW+UC+CSU)
• BASIC + URL’s SPPMI matrix + Guardians’ SPPMI matrix (BA-
SIC+CSU+CSG)
• BASIC + Network + URL’s content + SPPMI matrix of URLs +
SPPMI matrix of Guardians (BASIC+NW+UC+CSU+CSG)
• Our GAU model
Table 4 shows performance of the variants and the GAU model.
It shows the rank of each method based on reported metrics. By
adding social network information and fact-checking URL’s con-
tent to Equation 1, there was a huge climb in performance of BA-
SIC+NW+UC over BASIC across all metrics. In particular, Recall,
NDCG and MAP of BASIC+NW+UC were better than BASIC about
12.20%±1.31%, 13.39%±0.34% and 14.04%±0.76%, respectively (con-
fidence interval 95%). These results confirm the effectiveness of
exploiting auxiliary information.
How about using co-occurrence SPPMI matrices of fact-checking
URLs and guardians? First, when adding co-occurrence SPPMI
matrix of fact-checking URL (CSU) to the variant BASIC+NW+UC,
we did not see much improvement across all settings. Second, when
jointly factorizing two SPPMI matrices (BASIC+CSU+CSG) and
comparing it with the variant BASIC+NW+UC, we can see that
BASIC+CSU+CSG and BASIC+NW+UC performed equally well.
Again, BASIC+CSU+CSG did not use any additional data sources
except the interaction matrix X. It is an attractive benefit since it
did not depend on other data sources. In other words, it reflects that
regularizing the BASIC model with SPPMI matrices is comparable
to adding network data and URLs’ contents to the BASIC model.
So far, both auxiliary information and SPPMI matrices are bene-
ficial to improving recommendation quality. How about combin-
ing all of them into a single model? Will performance be further
improved? We turned to the variant BASIC+NW+UC+CSU+CSG.
As expected, BASIC+NW+UC+CSU+CSG enhanced CSU+CSG by
7.90%±1.79% Recall, 6.58%±0.40% NDCG, and 5.53%±0.22% MAP. Its
results were also higher than BASIC+NW+UC about 9.10%±6.15%
Recall, 7.92%±2.50% NDCG and 7.75%±0.58% MAP.
Since adding auxiliary data was valuable, we now exploit another
data source – 200 recent tweets’ content. Consistently, adding the
tweets’ content indeed improved performance. The improvement of
the GAU over BASIC+NW+UC+CSU+CSG model was 4.0% Recall,
6.6%NDCG and 8.4%MAP. This improvement is statistically signifi-
cant with p-value<0.001 using Wilcoxon one-sided test. Comparing
the GAU with the BASIC model, we observed a dramatic increase in
performance across all metrics. Specifically, Recall, NDCG andMAP
were improved by 25.13%±10.64%, 28.64%±7.13% and 32%±4.29%
respectively.
Based on the experiments, we conclude that auxiliary data as well
as co-occurrence matrices are helpful to improve recommendation
quality. Adding CSU+CSG or NW+UC enhanced the BASIC model
by 12% to 14%. Our GAU model performed best, which improved
the BASIC model by 25%∼32%.
6.4 Performance of GAU and Baselines (RQ3)
Figure 6 shows the performance of the four baselines and GAU.
MF was better than BPRMF which was designed to optimize Area
Under Curve (AUC). Similar results were reported in [55]. CTR was
a very competitive baseline. This reflects the importance of fact-
checking URL’s content (i.e., fact-checking page) in recommending
right fact-checking URLs to guardians. GAU performed better than
CTR by 12.75%±0.95% Recall, 11.2%±4.6%NDCG, and 12.5%±2.5%
MAP. GAU also outperformed CoFactor with a large margin by
25.8% ± 8.4% Recall, 29.2% ± 5.8% NDCG, and 32.6% ± 3.4%MAP
(confidence interval 95%). Overall, our GAU model significantly
outperformed all the baselines (p-value<0.001). The improvement
over the baselines was 11%∼33%.
6.5 Performance of Models for Different Types
of Guardians (RQ4)
We grouped guardians into three types based on the number of
their fact-checking URLs (i.e., the activeness level) to see whether
our GAU still outperforms the baselines in all the three types. By
sorting guardians in the ascending order of the number of their
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Figure 6: Performance of our GAU model and 4 baselines. The GAU model outperforms the baselines (p-value<0.001).
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Figure 7: Performance of GAU and baselines for three types of guardians. GAU outperforms the baselines (p-value<0.01).
fact-checking URLs, we annotated the first 20% guardians as cold-
start guardians, the next 60% guardians as warm-start guardians,
and the last 20% guardians as highly active guardians.
Figure 7 shows performance of GAU and the baselines in Top
15 results. A general pattern of all the models was that they per-
formed pretty well for cold-start guardians, and their performance
slightly decreased as guardians posted more fact-checking URLs.
We observed consistent results in top 5 and top10 as well.
GAU outperformed CTR in cold-start, warm-start and highly
active guardians, improving Recall@15 by 6.5%∼10.0%, NDCG@15
by 10.2%∼15.0%, and MAP@15 by 12.8%∼20.1%. Overall, GAU con-
sistently outperformed the baselines for all three groups according
to the three metrics. Its improvement was about 6.5%∼20.1%.
6.6 Exploiting hyper-parameters (RQ5)
We investigated the impact of hyper-parameters α , β and γ on the
GAU model. These hyper-parameters control the contribution of
social network, fact-checking URL’s content and 200 recent tweets’
content to the GAU. We tested α , β and γ from 0.01 to 0.09, increas-
ing 0.01 in each step, and then report the average recall@15, while
we fixed λ = 3 × 10−5 and the number of negative samples s = 10.
In Figure 8(a), we fixed β = 0.08 and varied α and γ . The general
trendwas that recall@15 graduallywent up, whenα andγ increased.
It reached the peak, when α = 0.06 and γ = 0.06. Next, we fixed
α = 0.08. It seems recall@15 fluctuated when varying β and γ , but
the amplitude was small. The max Recall@15 was only 2.2% larger
than the smallest Recall@15. Finally, γ was fixed to 0.08. The trend
was similar to Figure 8(a). In general, when α , β and γ are large, the
performance tends to improve, which suggests the importance of
regularizing our model using the auxiliary information.
7 DISCUSSION
In Section 4, we showed that guardians had great enthusiasm for
information credibility. Nevertheless, many guardians only posted
1∼2 fact-checking tweets. Therefore, we only recommended URLs
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Figure 8: Hyper-parameter sensitivity.
to highly enthusiastic guardians, who posted at least 3 fact-checking
URLs, because they may continue to be active in spreading fact-
checked information in the future. Another observation is that
the top verified guardians seem not to be active in the covered
time period. We conjecture that these verified guardians may be
cautious about what they should post to their followers [37]. We
also showed that exploiting auxiliary information indeed helped
improve recommendation quality. There is considerable potential to
integrate other data sources such as temporal factors and activeness
of guardians to further improve the proposed recommender system.
We leave them for future work.
8 CONCLUSION
We collected a list of guardians, who showed their interests in infor-
mation credibility by embedding fact-checking URLs in their posts.
The guardians were very active in posting credible information and
were mostly interested in politics, fauxotography and fake news.
After analyzing our dataset, we proposed a recommendation model
to personalize fact-checking URLs to the guardians toward enhanc-
ing their engagement in fact-checking activities and encouraging
them to post more credible information. Our proposed model out-
performed four baselines (i.e., MF, CoFactor, BPRMF and CTR). In
future work, we will upgrade our model to address the cold-start
issue where guardians posted less than 3 fact-checking URLs and
will investigate whether employing deep learning techniques would
further improve performance of our model.
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